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DISCUSSING ISLAM IN THE POST-9/11
EPISTEMOLOGICAL TERRAIN
Seval Yildirim*
In response to the title of the Symposium, Interpreting Is-
lam for the Western World, I would like to analyze the intellec-
tual environment that has emerged in the aftermath of 9/11,
specifically regarding discourses on Islam and Muslims.
In The Unthought in Contemporary Islamic Thought, Mo-
hammed Arkoun asserts that "any proposition is an act of
power whether followed by a result or not; for a proposition im-
plies selection from the range of significations in any tradition,
thus an orientation of meaning in a particular direction from all
the possible horizons of expectation of any given speaker ....
In other words, stating a proposition is an act of power because
it involves the selection of specific words, terms and phrases.
This selection steers the audience in a certain direction, and de-
termines not only the relevant concepts and meanings, but also
their location in the construction of a discourse. If stating a pro-
position is indeed an act of power, then I would like to exercise
this power to analyze the emergence of a new epistemological
terrain in the aftermath of the events of 9/11/2001.
One of Arkoun's many significant contributions to Islamic
studies has been his assertion that there is an urgent need to
discover the unthought and think the unthinkable in contempo-
rary Islamic thought. Arkoun wants to draw attention to the
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Pollock for his comments and his help in organizing and editing this piece. I would
like to thank the members of the PACE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW for inviting me
to this Symposium. They were also most gracious in the face of my critique of the
Symposium title and the images used to portray Islam on the Symposium pam-
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tension between the thought and the unthought, the thinkable
and the unthinkable. He writes, "[t]he unthought is made up of
the accumulated issues declared unthinkable in a given logo-
sphere."2 Thus, the unthought refers to the "ideas, values, ex-
planations, horizons of meaning . . . and ways of life" that are
"discarded, rejected, ignored or doomed to failure" because of
"the limits imposed by political and social pressures on the in-
novative and critical faculties of reason."3 I start with this pro-
position that there is indeed a significant amount of unthought
as well as thought that has been rendered unthinkable. Al-
though Arkoun speaks specifically about Islamic thought, I
would like to apply his thought and the unthought binary to the
discourses that have developed in the aftermath of the tragedies
of 9/11/2001, especially in the United States, although the im-
plications of these discourses are felt throughout the globe. Be-
cause every proposition is an act of power, how we choose to
articulate ourselves, our questions, and our linguistic choices in
determining the way we ask these questions are all acts of
power, and as parts of a more general discourse, they determine
what is thought and thinkable. I hope my propositions push
through the boundaries of the unthought.
The events of 9/11/2001 caused a wave in the epistemologi-
cal terrain amidst which the discourses on Islam, Islamic law
and Muslims take place. By epistemological terrain, I mean the
entirety of the information and knowledge production, creation
of a normalized knowledge base - including, but not exclusive
to, the mainstream media, discourses of governments (espe-
cially that of the world hegemon, the United States), suggestive
names given to military aggression, consistent display of
images as representative of Islam and Muslims, and constant
misappropriation and abuse of human rights language as a jus-
tification for unilateral military invasions. For instance, since
9/11/2001, we have seen repeated images of veiled Muslim wo-
men, Muslim men kneeling with foreheads touching the ground
(including on the pamphlet of this symposium), and heard re-
peated stories about human rights abuses in Muslim majority
2 Id. at 12.
3 Id. at 11.
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countries. There are numerous television shows, like Fox's 24,4
almost exclusively about the Muslim terrorist, whose beliefs
and passions always look the same no matter what the ethno-
geographic background. The internet is a breeding ground not
just for Islamic fundamentalist discourse, but also for Is-
lamophobic propaganda with websites like Daniel Pipes' Cam-
pus Watch,5 or Robert Spencer's Jihad Watch. 6 Even academics
who claim affinity to Muslims engage in scholarship and public
discourse that make it common to talk of Muslims as always
potentially dangerous. Noah Feldman's recent article, "Iran
and the Bomb" in the New York Times Magazine is an
example. 7
I propose that we are now participants in a new epistemo-
logical terrain where there is a mainly covert acceptance of Sa-
muel Huntington's Clash of Civilizations argument leading to
overt destructive policies on the political-military front.8 The
clash of civilizations argument has been normalized and has
been expanded upon by utilizing essentialized definitions of
"the West" and "Islam" as uniform, coherent, opposing entities.
In this new terrain, various forms of past and ongoing state acts
of terrorism have been qualified as self-defense or as necessary
in furthering human rights. 9
This new epistemological terrain is one featuring a ques-
tionable Islam that needs interpretation to be understood ver-
sus the questioning West - as in the title of this symposium,
Interpreting Islam for the Western World.
4 See generally FOX Broadcasting Company: 24, http://www.fox.com24 (last
visited Apr. 11, 2008).
5 See generally Campus Watch: Monitoring Middle East Studies on Campus,
http://www.campus-watch.org (last visited Apr. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Campus
Watch].
6 See generally Jihad Watch, http://www.jihadwatch.org (last visited Apr. 11,
2008).
7 See Noah Feldman, Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 29, 2006, at 650, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/29/magazine/
29islam.html?ex=1175572800&en=41e3528999bd7f7c&ei=5070.
8 For Huntington's essay where he puts forth this argument, see Samuel P.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Summer 1993, at 22-
49.
9 See generally Thalif Deen, U.N. Member States Struggle to Define Terror-
ism, INTER PRESS SERVICE, July 25, 2005, http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=
29633.
3
PACE INT'L L. REV[
I do not mean to suggest that this epistemological terrain is
brand new or abruptly born in the aftermath of 9/11. Rather, it
is a continuation of the earlier colonialist and Orientalist narra-
tives of the civilized West versus the exotic, mystical Eastern
other.10 It is, however, of a new nature owing to the possibili-
ties of our new techno-scientific age, with television and the in-
ternet making it possible to spread information, knowledge and
propaganda with relative ease.11 In this new epistemological
terrain, it is not only expected and acceptable to seek explana-
tions of Islam for the West, but it is even desirable and to be
commended, as an act of generous inquiry - almost like when a
grandparent approaches a child in play and asks "what are the
parameters of your imaginary world?" The unthought part of
this picture is that the grandparent is in a position of power as
to the child and asks without fear, for it is to the grandparent's
paradigms to which the child must relate. In other words, the
grandparent needs to understand because, after all, it is the
adult world that determines what the acceptable terms and
methods of play are.
Also in this new epistemological terrain, we have overt mil-
itary aggression by the world hegemon, the United States, justi-
fied with the language of human rights. What I have elsewhere
termed the "definitionless and boundariless" War on Terror
utilizes the language of human rights and claims that its mili-
10 In fact, even the events of 9/11/2001 and the U.S. responses to them (from
the invasion of Afghanistan to the invasion of Iraq, and the possible future inva-
sion of Iran) could be seen as the continuation of alliances, interest-formations and
global business objectives including, but certainly not exclusive to, Middle Eastern
oil. For a much more eloquent and detailed argument of this possibility, see Jac-
ques Derrida & Lieven De Cauter, For a Justice to Come: an Interview with Jac-
ques Derrida, in THE DERRIDA-HABERMAS READER 259-69 (Lasse Thomassen ed.,
2006). Derrida argues:
The day when this history will be written, when the documents are made
public, it will become clear that September 11 was preceded by highly
complicated underhand negotiations, often in Europe, on the subject of
petrol-pipeline passage, at a time when the petrol clan was in power.
There were intrigues and threats and it is not impossible to think that one
day it will be discovered that it was really the Bush clan that was targeted
rather than the country, the America of Clinton.
Id. at 266.
11 See ARKOUN, supra note 1, at 224-25, 307. For a further analysis of what I
call "techno-scientific age," see Arkoun's definition of what he refers to as "tele-
techno-scientific reason" or "tele-techno-scientific civilization"). Id.
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tary aggression and violence is only committed to realizing and
furthering the inherent and basic rights of the Iraqi people. 12
This utilization is evident not only in the increased focus on how
women are oppressed in Muslim societies, but also in the name
of the U.S. invasion of Iraq - "Operation Iraqi Freedom." What
meaningful freedom, if any, has come from this aggression is at
best questionable. 13
A most fundamental building block, or rather the glue to
this new epistemological terrain of the questionable Islam and
the questioning West, is the concept of the "moderate Muslim."
Who is this moderate Muslim, and what is it that makes her
moderate? How about the concept of "moderation?" This
phrase, "moderate Muslim," is often used as an antithesis of the
fundamentalist Muslim. Then, is this moderate Muslim one
that internalizes Islam with moderation not entirely, not fully,
but only to a certain extent, only so far as it does not contradict
or challenge the propositions of the new epistemological terrain,
as opposed to the fundamentalist Muslim who somehow figured
out the so-called fundamentals or the core of Islam and chooses
to practice it fully, internalize Islam entirely?. It seems the
moderate Muslim generally says Muslims should engage the
governments, peoples and discourses of European and North
American societies and not be hostile to market economy and
liberal ideology. Of course, there are other more stringent defi-
nitions, such as Daniel Pipes' moderate Muslim who is never
critical of Israeli aggression against Palestinians and is neces-
sarily anti-Islamist, 14 though it is not clear what being anti-Is-
lamist means. Very much in keeping with President Bush's
now famous words, "You are either with us or against us," the
concept of the moderate Muslim as the desirable and un-
threatening Muslim is necessary to the sustenance of this new
12 See Seval Yildirim, Empowering the Human in Human Rights Discourse,
100 Am. Soc'y INT'L L. 409 (2006).
13 Rather, in Iraq, we are witnessing a new form of colonization where the
objective is access to the resources of the invaded land, rather than the control of
the land within its apparent physical boundaries. I am indebted to my friend, Mu-
cahit Bilici for helping me formulate this idea. For his eloquent analysis of this
argument, see Mucahit Bilici, Ummah and Empire: Global Formations after Na-
tion, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY IsLAMIc THOUGHT 313,
313-27 (Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi ed., 2006). For the definition of what Bilici calls the
"new (American) empire," see id. at 323-24.
14 See generally Campus Watch, supra note 5.
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epistemological terrain. 15 It tells every actor in the terrain,
Muslim or not, that there is a certain kind of Muslim that is not
a threat because that Muslim, the moderate, has accepted the
propositions of the powers that determine the landscape of
knowledge and information. I suggest that the concept of the
moderate Muslim helps create and sustain a covert fascism in
this new epistemology wherein only a certain kind of Muslim is
acceptable, and critical engagement with U.S. foreign policy or
Israeli state aggression always translates as Islamist
propaganda.
This new epistemological terrain is also hegemonic and ex-
clusivist. Prior to 9/11, although there existed similar dis-
courses about Islam, two things were different. First, the
discourses on Islam were not available to the masses to the de-
gree that they are today. There were news reports and images
here and there, and certainly the first Gulf War introduced Sad-
dam Hussein as the existential villain, but these were not domi-
nant in the mass psyche. The "Muslim villain" existed
alongside other thinkable villains.
Second, there existed multiple epistemological fields - not
to suggest that they were all equally influential or powerful, but
more of them had legitimacy. In the aftermath of 9/11, there
has developed a culture of fear, perhaps a little like the nuclear
scare but with a much more threatening, much more difficult to
predict and to control phenomenon of the suicide bomber who is
not afraid to die. With repeated statements by the various per-
sonalities of the Bush government 16 coupled with a color-coded
15 George W. Bush, President of the United States, The President Convenes
Homeland Security Council: Remarks by the President at the Meeting of Home-
land Security Advisory Council (June 12, 2002), ("And we're just going to have to
enforce the doctrine, either you're with us or against us. You join the coalition of
freedom, or you're on the other side of the fence."), transcript available at http:fl
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020612-3.html. Later in 2002,
Bush repeated his message to the United Nations General Assembly. See Julia
Preston, America's Message to the U.N.: You are with Us or Against Us, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD, Oct. 25, 2002, available at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/
2002/10/24/1035416936620.html. See also "You are Either with Us or Against Us,"
Nov. 6, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com200l/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 11, 2008).
16 See generally United States House of Representatives Committee on Gov-
ernment Reform - Minority Staff Special Investigations Division, Iraq on the Re-
cord - The Bush Administration's Public Statements on Iraq (prepared for Rep.
Henry A. Waxman), Mar. 16, 2004, available at http://oversight.house.govllraqOn
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warning system, 17 and the new and far-reaching Homeland Se-
curity Office,' 8 the policies and choices of the government are
justified in the name of national security and self-protection.
Any alternative discourse that challenges these policies is easily
dismissed as un-patriotic and ignorant of contemporary reali-
ties at best, or as a supporter of terrorism at worst. For in-
stance, in 2002, even otherwise anti-war Democratic members
of Congress, like John Kerry or Hillary Clinton, voted in sup-
port of Bush's war.19
Alternative voices have been rendered to the periphery of
the public psyche through the unquestioning acceptance of the
perpetual fear and the ever-present danger of terror. In other
words, the rhetoric of a hostile, backward, fundamental Islam
that is destructive if taken as a whole or to its potential bounda-
ries, and the need to combat this Islam not only through mili-
tary combat in oil-rich lands but also through ideological and
cultural means all over the globe has been the determining
principle of all discourse. Any alternative perception has been
relegated to the domain of the unthinkable and much of that
alternative remains unthought.
We have seen floods of apologetic literature by Muslims em-
phasizing Islam's peaceful nature and that not all Muslims are
terrorists. Such literature brings us back to the concept of the
moderate Muslim who sees peace in Islam rather than ideals
with which to question the status quo. With this rampant fear,
there has emerged the new epistemological terrain of the ques-
tionable Islam in need of translation for a Western world, pre-
sumably consisting of the various and varying components of
TheRecord/pdf admin iraqon.the record rep.pdf. The report contains "237 mis-
leading statements made by Bush Administration officials about the threat posed
by Iraq." Government Reform Minority Office, About Iraq on the Record, http:l/
oversight.house.gov/IraqOnTheRecord/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
17 See Terror Threat Warning System Revealed, Mar. 12, 2002, http:llarchives.
cnn.com/20021US/03/12/rec.threat.alerts/index.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2008).
18 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135,
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf.
19 See Deborah White, Iraq War Vote 2002: 156 Congress Members Who Voted
No, ABouT.CoM: LIBERAL POLITICS: U.S., http://usliberals.about.com/od/liberallead-
ership/a/IraqNayVote.htm (last visited Nov. 18, 2007). This is not to imply that
there was a unanimous vote either in the House of Representatives or the Senate
approving the Bush Administration's war plans. For a list of the Congress mem-
bers who voted against invading Iraq, see id.
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North America and Western Europe. This new epistemological
terrain has become hegemonic because it has succeeded in
presenting itself as the only safe and secure terrain. If we step
outside its boundaries, we are either a threat because we pose a
danger as terrorists or terrorist sympathizers, or we are in dan-
ger because we participate in making it easier for the terrorists.
This new epistemological terrain is not simply local; rather,
it is increasingly global. Although in the United States we are
in the epicenter of this terrain, its soil is present all over the
globe in increasing polarization between public discourses
framed as secular versus fundamentalist, as well as in govern-
ment reactions to and policies concerning these discourses. In
fact, the War on Terror rhetoric has been utilized by numerous
governments to justify and perpetuate policies of oppression
and the curbing of individual freedoms. For example, the Rus-
sian government has repeatedly justified its military aggression
against the Chechen people in terms of fighting Islamic funda-
mentalism. 20 The prohibition on headcoverings in Turkish gov-
ernment spaces has been justified on the basis of fighting
Islamic fundamentalism, which is the argument that has been
accepted by the European Court of Human Rights. 21 So, even
an international juristic body has now been converted to a resi-
dent of this new epistemological terrain. Again, references to
Islamic fundamentalism are common in debates over
headcoverings throughout Europe.
Given the restrictive and even oppressive nature of this
new epistemological terrain, should we then not ask any ques-
tions about Islam and Muslims? Silence and sustained igno-
rance is not the way to alter this terrain. Rather, we must
deconstruct the propositions of this terrain by subversive strat-
egies by seeking the unthought and the unthinkable, by ques-
tioning every concept that is used to build, sustain and foster
this new epistemological terrain. We must continuously strive
20 See, e.g., Mark Baker, Russia: On Beslan, Putin Looks Beyond Chechnya,
Sees International Terror, RADIO FREE EUROPE, RADIO LIBERTY, Sept. 7, 2004,
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/09/ce476827-Olec-417f-a4lc-44b2019e
125f.html.
21 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, 18 Eur. Ct. H.R. 590 (2005), available at http:ll
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/default.htm (follow "Access Hudoc Collection" hyper-
link; then search "Case Title" for "Leyla Sahin v. Turkey"; then follow "1. Case of
Leyla Sahin v. Turkey" hyperlink).
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for even the slightest shifts toward an ideal epistemology that is
inclusive and pluralist. By this, I imagine a terrain that recog-
nizes and incorporates multiple voices equally, and at least rec-
ognizes the privileging of certain voices over others.
Keeping in mind that every proposition is an act of power,
we must choose our words carefully and always question which
power base we are supporting. To that end, I propose that we
question the use of the concept of "interpretation" when discuss-
ing Islam. Interpretation is a necessity between parties who
are foreign to each other and who share no common linguistic
system with which to communicate. Islam and its cultural
manifestations are not foreign to any part of the world. Even in
this country, Islam is no stranger not only because of immigrant
communities, but also because of the long-rooted presence of Is-
lam in black communities. Subversive strategies must include
a re-assessment of narratives presented as historical truisms
that portray Islam as only limited to Asia and Africa.
The polarization of "Islam" versus "the West" is political
and ideological. It is not historical, and it does not have to be
epistemological.
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